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Abstract The EU’s sporting competence derives from
the legal norm, established by the European Court of Jus-
tice, that requires that ‘sporting rules’ of sports governing
bodies which have an economic impact and which breach
the fundamental freedoms or competition law can only be
justified if shown to be a proportionate response to an
inherent need in the sport. However, the certainty of this
norm is undermined by the EU’s subsequent Treaty com-
petence for sport, a political compromise, which is
ambiguous, and which in due course generated the Euro-
pean Commission’s sports policy, with its emphasis on
governance and social dialogue. Consequently, EU sports
law has evolved into ‘soft law’ which is far from coherent.
This is demonstrated in the tolerance shown for certain of
UEFA’s ‘sporting rules’, notably its Financial Fair Play
Regulations, which restrict competition and lack propor-
tionality yet have not attracted sanction from the European
Commission (a sports law policy which could be charac-
terised as not even constituting soft law but delegalisation).
Keywords Financial fair play  Competition  EU soft
sports law
1 Introduction
Since the EU institutions are restrained by the Treaty on the
Functioning of the European Union (‘‘TFEU’’) from stip-
ulating a clear sports law, outside of very vague principles,
the EU’s sporting competence is limited and lacks concrete
shape.1 Weatherill encapsulates its amorphous nature when
he refers to ‘an EU sports law (of sorts).’2
An EU competence in sport first arose from decisions
(considered below) of the Court of Justice of the European
Union (CJEU), which established the legal norm that
within the EU, professional sports, specifically the ‘sport-
ing rules’3 of sports governing bodies (SGBs), are subject
to the classic Treaty economic freedoms and competition
law; albeit that, given the sport sector’s specific charac-
teristics, it would sometimes receive special treatment.
From the start, therefore, the precise shape of the EU’s
sporting competence was unclear, and as a result EU sports
law has evolved as a result of negotiations between adverse
interest groups.4 During this process, in an example of the
‘judicialisation’ of the EU’s political system, (whereby
judicial law-making affects ‘the strategic behaviour of non-
judicial agents of governance’),5 first a formal, but weak,
treaty competence for sport was introduced in the Lisbon
Treaty, and then the European Commission (EC), under the
so-called Community method, instituted a sports policy, a
form of soft law.
Although legal positivists doubt the existence of soft
law, arguing that law is hard or not law at all; soft law is an
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3 The sporting rules which govern for example the number of players
in a team, the size of the pitch and so on are uncontroversial; this
article considers the sporting rules devised by SGBs that have an
economic impact, such as rules on how players can be transferred
between clubs, rules on the numbers of non ‘home-grown’ players a
team may field, and rules restricting investment in clubs such as the
FFP Regulations; for a discussion on ‘sporting rules’ see Garcia and
Weatherill (2012), p. 238.
4 Parrish (2012), p. 716.
5 Stone Sweet (2010).
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autonomous category of norms,6 and an important con-
stituent of EU law, and often accompanies the creation of a
new EU competence. Terpan identifies a gap in the liter-
ature clearly identifying exactly what is meant by soft law,
and how it is differentiated from hard law. He provides an
overview of soft and hard norms in the EU which he cat-
egorises by reference to the strength of obligation and
enforcement; there being a continuum between hard law at
one end of the spectrum (with hard obligation and
enforcement) through to a non-legal norm (no obligation or
enforcement) at the other end. Furthermore he also con-
sidered that ‘soft norms and coordination may provide a
viable alternative to hard norms’.7 In the case of the EU’s
sports competence, the EC’s sports policy, or soft law, has
modulated the legal norm created by the CJEU. What
Terpan refers to as ‘delegalisation’ has occurred, the pro-
cess whereby a legal norm is transformed into a non-legal
norm, when both the obligation and enforcement elements
have fallen into desuetude.8
This article considers the discrepancies between the
EC’s sports policy, and the legal norm created by the
CJEU, and concludes that they are explained by the EC’s
importation of EU social law into its sports policy,
specifically the requirement for social dialogue within
sports governance. As a result SGBs have been granted
excessive latitude by the EC in regard to compliance of
their ‘sporting rules’ with competition law. Examples of
this are the EC’s endorsement of UEFA’s 2001 Transfer
Regulations,9 its ‘home-grown’ players rule10 and most
recently the Financial Fair Play Regulations (FFP Regu-
lations).11 The article concludes with a review of the FFP
Regulations, (which have been the subject of claims
brought before both the EC and the CJEU, albeit the only
substantive rulings to date have been of a procedural nature
only as considered further in the Conclusion). Given that
academic opinion (discussed below) is of the view that the
FFP Regulations infringe EU competition law, the fact that
the EC has supported them (albeit somewhat indirectly, as
discussed below) is compelling evidence of the current
incoherency of EU sports law resulting from the diver-
gence of the EC sports policy from the CJEU sports law
norm. Any ruling the CJEU may make on the FFP Regu-
lations has been described by Weatherill as an acid test of
the latitude to be given to SGBs and the extent of the
deference the courts are willing to extend to sporting
autonomy: ‘what is at stake here is the intellectual and
strategic heart of ‘EU sports law’.12
2 What is ‘EU Sports law’?
Pluralist theories of law accept that law is more than simply
a manifestation of state control; and sports law,13 an
umbrella term describing a diverse set of rules and doc-
trines, has entered the legal lexicon.
The development of public sports law (including EU
sports law) has been complicated by judicial reluctance14
to intervene in the decisions of SGBs (which are for the
main private bodies15) who have jealously guarded their
legal autonomy,16 and this has been exacerbated by the
asymmetry between national legal systems and the global
transnational SGBs. The phrase ‘lex sportiva’ has been
coined to describe the element of sporting self-regulation
whereby the sporting world has carved a niche private legal
order separate and apart from national, EU and
6 Terpan (2015), p. 74.
7 ibid, p. 69.
8 ibid, p. 68.
9 For a discussion of these see Pearson (2015), p. 220.
10 See Parrish et al. (2014), p. 493.
11 See UEFA (2015a). For analysis of the FFP Regulations see Long
(2012); Flanagan (2013); Lindholm (2010); Petit (2014); Vopel
(2013); Serby (2014b); Bastianon (2015).
12 Weatherill (2013); lawyer Jean-Louis Dupont, who acted for
Bosman, brought a complaint to both the EC and the Brussels Court
of First Instance on behalf of players’ agent Striani stating that the
‘break-even’ rule generates the following restrictions of competition;
restriction of investment; fossilisation of existing market structure; a
reduction in the number of transfers; deflationary effect on players’
wages and hence also agents’ fees; see Dupont (2013). In June 2015
the Brussels Court of First Instance made a reference to the CJEU for
a preliminary ruling on whether the FFP Regulations violate the EU
fundamental freedoms of free competition (Arts 101 and 102 TFEU),
free movement of capital and freedom to invest (Art 63 TFEU) and
free movement of workers and free movement of services. The CJEU
rejected the reference since the Brussels court had accepted it was
incompetent itself to deal with the Striani case as it had no
jurisdiction. Since the EC also rejected Striani’s case in October
2014 on the basis that the Brussels court was handling his complaint,
the case may return to the EC; see European Commission (2014a); see
Van Rompuy (2015).
13 Latty (2011). Latty refutes the ‘Sports and the Law theory’ that
maintains there is no such thing as sports law, just sport and the law.
14 The courts in the UK and elsewhere have taken their lead from
Lord Denning’s maxim in Enderby Town FC v the FA [1971] Ch 591,
605: ‘Justice can often be done in them [domestic tribunals] better by
a good layman than a bad lawyer’.
15 This tends to be the case in legal systems with a common law
heritage, whereas other legal systems, for example in France, provide
that decisions of sports federations, (which have association status
under private law), can be reviewed under the competence of an
administrative judge.
16 The Olympic movement led the way; Rule 25 of the 1949 Olympic
Charter required autonomy for the National Olympic Committees and
Rule 61 of the Charter states that ‘IOC decisions are final. An athlete
may submit his or her claim to the Court of Arbitration of Sport’.
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international law.17 Lex sportiva describes a form of
transnational law,18 in which disputes between clubs, ath-
letes, federations and SGBs, which arise from the con-
tractual nexus between these entities, (with the SGBs on
the top of the sporting pyramid) are submitted to private
arbitration, often with a right of appeal to the Court of
Arbitration of Sport, based in Lausanne, Switzerland.
The emergence of an EU sports law, which as pointed
out by Parrish19 complements lex sportiva, has been
coloured by the initial absence of any specific Treaty-based
sports competence, and the incremental nature of litiga-
tion20 and complaint handling. The origins of EU sports
law can be traced to the 1974 Walrave case,21 in which the
CJEU held that there was no total exemption for sport in
the application of the laws of the European treaties, but
that, ‘the practice of sport is subject to Community law
only in so far as it constitutes an economic activity within
the meaning of Article 2 of the Treaty’.22
The ruling also clarified that the Treaty provisions
prohibiting nationality discrimination in Articles 18, 45 and
56 carried horizontal direct effect, and that they could be
invoked by a private party in a national court (in this case
two athletes) against rules of a private regulator (such as a
sports governing body) aimed at regulating in a collective
manner gainful employment and the provision of services,
and did not just constrain the actions of public bodies.23
Developing the Walrave ruling, and applying it in the
context of football’s transfer rules and nationality quotas in
relation to fielding foreign players, the Bosman24 decision
in 1995 dealt a serious blow to the traditional legal
autonomy of SGBs. Weatherill25 notes that the decision
represents a shift from the test laid down in Walrave
because the CJEU did not assess whether the transfer
regulations were a purely sporting rule (sporting rules in
Walrave had been considered exempt) but held that, since
they represented an obstacle to a fundamental freedom,
they had to be ‘justified’.26 In the subsequent Meca Med-
ina27 case the CJEU clarified the position with regard to
‘sporting rules’ and said that: ‘it is apparent that the mere
fact that a rule is purely sporting in nature does not have
the effect of removing from the scope of the Treaty the
person engaging in the activity governed by that rule or the
body which has laid it down.’28
In Meca Medina, the CJEU applying for the first time
what are now Articles 101 and 102,29 rather than Treaty
provisions on the free movement of persons or services,
held that there is no blanket immunity from EU competi-
tion law for ‘sporting rules’, and that they need to be jus-
tified by a legitimate objective and be proportionate.
Applying the Wouters30 test the Court held that the sporting
rule in Meca Medina did not breach EU competition law
only because the court was satisfied that:
such a limitation is inherent in the organisation and
proper conduct of competitive sport and its very
purpose is to ensure healthy rivalry between ath-
letes…in order not to be covered by the prohibition
laid down in Article 81(1) EC, the restrictions thus
imposed by those rules must be limited to what is
necessary to ensure the proper conduct of competitive
sport.31
The CJEU held that justification for the sporting rule did
not necessitate an analysis of the exemption criteria pro-
vided for in Article 101(3) TFEU. As Parrish notes32, this
presents SGBs with a broader set of defences under com-
petition law than provided for in the exemption criteria
under the Article 101(3) TFEU economic efficiency tests.
As SGBs fought back in the aftermath of Bosman
against what they perceived was the threat to their legal
autonomy, a political consensus formed which led to
17 For example the regulations published by the governing body of
world football FIFA, the FIFA Statutes, Art 64(2)–(3) purport to
prevent access to ‘ordinary courts of law’ to players. For a discussion
of lex sportiva see Parrish (2012); Foster (2003).
18 See Duval (2013) for a discussion of the meaning and legitimacy
of transnational sports law, also Foster (2003).
19 Parrish (2012).
20 See Weatherill (2011), also Van den Bogaert and Vermeersch
(2006), p. 821.
21 Case 36/74 Walrave and Koch v. Union Cycliste Internationale
[1974] ECR 1405. The claimants in Walrave, who had not been
selected as pacemakers for the national cycling team on the ground
that they were not nationals, brought a claim of unlawful discrim-
ination under European law. They failed, since the court accepted that
selection for national teams based on nationality was of ‘purely
sporting interest’ and had nothing to do with economic activity
(judgment para 8).
22 ibid, para 4.
23 ibid, paras 18 and 34.
24 Case 415/93, Union Royale Belge des Societes de Football
Association ASBL v. Jean-Marc Bosman [1995] ECR I-04921.
UEFA’s then transfer rules were held to infringe the right to free
movement and non-discrimination, see Weatherill (2011).
25 Weatherill (2003), p. 56.
26 Bosman n 24 supra, para 21.
27 Case C-519/04P Meca-Medina v Commission of the European
Communities [2006] ECR I-6991. Two swimmers claimed that a ban
based on a doping offence, upheld by CAS, infringed EU competition
law, there being collusion between the governing body, CAS and the
testers. For further analysis on Meca-Medina see Szyszczak (2007)
32(1).
28 Meca-Medina n 27 supra, at para 27.
29 Formerly Articles 81 and 82.
30 Case 309/99 Wouters v. Algemene Raad van de Nederlandse Orde
van Advocaten [2002] ECR I-1577.
31 Meca-Medina, n 27 supra para 45 and 47.
32 Parrish (2012), p. 722.
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Treaty Declarations33 and the Helsinki Report34 (neither of
which was legally binding instruments) which included
references to the ‘specificity of sport’.35 Garcia and
Weatherill describe ‘specificity’ as the ‘next best’ argu-
ment of SGBs after autonomy, ‘autonomy is a claim to
immunity. Specificity is a claim to have the law moulded in
application to meet sport’s special concerns.’36 The EC’s
2007 White Paper on Sport,37 a significant EU sports
policy document, was an attempt to summarise EU sports
law, as contained in the rulings of the CJEU, and its
practical effect on the ability of SGBs to govern their
sports. The White Paper describes how the ‘specificity’
doctrine can be approached through two prisms: one relates
to the specificity of sporting rules, for example separation
between men and women, the need to ensure uncertainty of
outcome and a preservation of competitive balance; and the
other to the specificity of the structure of sport, for example
the autonomy of sports organisations with their pyramid
structure and solidarity mechanisms, and organisation
along national grounds.38
The status of SGBs, and their access to political leaders,
makes them a part of the elite pluralism39 which charac-
terises EU interest politics. An example of UEFA’s ongo-
ing political influence over EU sports policy making, is its
presence (as an observer) at the meetings of the Expert
Groups on sport, set up by the Council to inform EU sport
policy making.40 SGBs, in particular UEFA, assiduously
lobby members of the European Parliament, which has
come out in support of potentially anti-competitive sport-
ing rules.41
European political leaders support for the right to
sporting self-determination,42 led in due course to a very
limited formal competence for the EU in sport in a new
Article 165 in the Lisbon Treaty: while taking account of
the specific nature of sport43 [Union action shall be aimed
at] developing the European dimension in sport, by pro-
moting fairness and openness in sporting competitions and
co-operation between bodies responsible for sports44 [the
action should take the form of the European Parliament and
the Council] adopting incentive measures, excluding any
harmonisation of the laws and regulations of the Member
States.45 According to Articles 2(5) and 6 TFEU the only
EU action legitimised is complementary, co-ordinating and
supporting in nature, (the weakest of the three competences
set out in Title I of Part One of the Treaty46 ).
Since the European Union operates on the principle of
conferral, the Lisbon Treaty undoubtedly altered the rela-
tionship between sport and EU law, as now the direct
involvement of the EU in sports policy was constitu-
tional.47 Rather than being a threat to the autonomy of
SGBs however, the inclusion of a specific sporting com-
petence in the Lisbon Treaty, with its weak legislative
remit and reference to the ‘specificity of sport’ is an
example of the ‘strategy of empowering the EU in order to
restrain it’48.
Weatherill, while citing ‘openness’ and ‘fairness’ as
candidate principles of a developing EU sports law post
Lisbon, doubted whether the formal Treaty competence for
sport acquired in 2009 would change the scope of the pre-
existing EU sports law, in particular in relation to sports
governance. He said that Article 165 ‘certainly does not
allow the EU to usurp the proper place of sports organi-
sations in selecting their preferred system of
governance…’.49
Parrish, on the other hand, sees sports governance as
within the EU sports competence: ‘while EU sports law
recognises a territory of sporting self-regulation governed
by the lex sportiva, it conditions this autonomy on the
acceptance of the integration of general principles of law
into the lex sportiva—such as proportionality and good
governance.’5033 Treaty of Amsterdam 1997, Declaration 29; Treaty of Nice 2000,
Annex IV. ‘The Nice Declaration on Sport’ as part of the Presidency
Conclusions in December 2000. Declaration on the specific charac-
teristics of sport and its social function in Europe, of which account
should be taken in implementing common policies, Nice European
Council Meeting, December 2000.
34 COM (1999) 664 Final 10/12/99.
35 see for example the Treaty of Amsterdam (1997): ‘The Conference
therefore calls on the bodies of the European Union to listen to sports
associations when important questions affecting sport are at issue’.
36 Garcia and Weatherill (2012), p. 18.
37 European Commission (2007), at 4.1.
38 ibid, at 4.1.
39 Mazey and Richardson (2006), p. 247.
40 See further discussion at Geeraert and Drieskens (2015).
41 Garcia (2007), p. 215.
42 Garcia and Weatherill (2012), in which they discuss the political
agreement to curtail the competence of the EU in sport, which
resulted in art 165.
43 Art 165(1) TFEU.
44 Art 165(2) TFEU.
45 Art 165(4) TFEU.
46 Art 6(e) TFEU.
47 As a result of Case 106/96, United Kingdom v Commission of the
European Communities [1998] E.C.R. I-2729 the Commission had
been obliged to switch sports funding into education, an area of
existing competence.
48 See Garcia and Weatherill (2012), p. 18. This conclusion is
reinforced by the doubts as to the extent of the horizontal reach of Art
165. By contrast TFEU Arts 8 (equality between men and women), 11
(environmental protection) and 12 (consumer protection) are clearly
worded to require the EU institutions to respect these obligations
when exercising other treaty competences.
49 Weatherill (2011), p. 38.
50 Parrish (2012), p. 716.
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Parrish is correct in so much as he accurately reflects, as
discussed below, the EC’s own reading of its sporting
competence. Weatherill is also right in that neither the
sporting decisions of the CJEU, nor Article 165, justify this
interpretation by the EC of the EU sporting competence.
From this stems the current incoherence in EU sports law,
which is reflected in the recent debate over the lawfulness
of UEFA’s FFP Regulations, deemed by academics as in
breach of EU competition law.51
3 EU sports law as sports policy: the role
of the European commission in the regulation
of sport in the EU
Under Terpan’s definition of EU legal norms,52 and their
position within the hard/soft law spectrum, law is hard
where a very constraining form of non-judicial control is
possible. The legal norm originating in the sporting deci-
sions of the CJEU discussed above is soft, since non-ju-
dicial control of SGBs is undermined by the indeterminate
nature of the doctrine of the ‘specificity of sport’. There is
no closed list of sporting rules that offend against EU law,
and according to the CJEU in Meca-Medina:
the compatibility of rules with the Community rules
on competition cannot be assessed in the abstract […]
account must first of all be taken of the overall con-
text in which the decision of the association of
undertakings was taken or produces its effects and,
more specifically, of its objectives. It has then to be
considered whether the consequential effects restric-
tive of competition are inherent in the pursuit of those
objectives (Wouters and Others, paragraph 97) and
are proportionate to them.53
Article 165 also undermines effective non-judicial
enforcement, since sport is placed within the weakest of the
EU competences, and so Article 165 ‘emphatically does
not elevate the EU to the position of general ‘sports reg-
ulator’ in Europe.’54
Lacking any legislative jurisdiction under Article 165,
the EC’s sports policy is soft law arrived at through policy
documents,55 inspired by research,56 and implemented in
its steering of SGBs:
Through its dialogue with sport stakeholders, the
Commission will continue its efforts to explain, on a
theme-per-theme basis, the relation between EU law
and sporting rules in professional and amateur sport.
As requested by Member States and the sport
movement in the consultation, the Commission is
committed to supporting an appropriate interpretation
of the concept of the specific nature of sport and will
continue to provide guidance in this regard. Regard-
ing the application of EU competition law, the
Commission will continue to apply the procedure as
foreseen in Regulation (EC) No 1/2003.57
Steering is most effective under the ‘shadow of hierar-
chy’,58 i.e. where it is backed up by the threat of sanctions,
yet Weatherill59 agrees with Pearson60 that the EC has been
generous with the latitude shown SGBs.
For example, the evidence from a 2013 study,61 suggests
that UEFA’s 2001 Transfer Regulations (endorsed by the
EC and a replacement of the version ruled unlawful by
Bosman), constrain smaller clubs from competing in the
transfer market, and that their objective, namely to incen-
tivise training and development of young players, is not
met either. Pearson argues that a challenge to the 2001
Transfer Regulations under EU competition law would
succeed under the Wouters criteria. The lack of ability of
smaller clubs to compete in the market for the elite players
could be judged to be contrary to the ‘fairness and open-
ness in sporting competitions’ principle in Article 165.62
Another example of the EC’s latitude towards UEFA’s
‘sporting rules’ can be seen in its endorsement of the
‘home-grown player rule’ whose proclaimed object is to
increase competitive balance and improve the training and
development of young players. However Parrish et al.
argue that it gives rise to indirect nationality
discrimination.63
The EC is subject to a degree of control (from Member
States, the Council and Parliament) and although it has
some degree of autonomy in formulating competition
policy in the sports field, it does not take decisions in a
51 For example see the literature cited at n 11 supra.
52 Terpan (2015).
53 Meca Medina n 27 supra, para 42.
54 Weatherill (2011), p. 38.
55 For example the European Commission (2007) see n 37 supra and
European Commission (2011) at n 57 infra.
56 See for example KEA/CDES (2013).
57 European Commission (2011) at 4.2 ‘The specific nature of sport’.
58 Terpan (2015), p. 93.
59 Weatherill (2014), p. 117.
60 See Pearson (2015) for an analysis of the potential non-compliance
with EU competition law of the transfer regulations; and Egger and
Stix-Hackl (2002).
61 KEA/CDES (2013).
62 Pearson (2015), p. 237.
63 Parrish et al (2014), p. 493. This was introduced at the start of the
2006/7 season and requires clubs entering UEFA competitions to
name eight ‘‘home-grown’’ players in their 25-man squad.
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political vacuum.64 Geeraert and Drieskens see the latitude
given by the EC to SGBs as ‘[the] politicisation of public
enforcement of competition law’ which has led to the
‘generous treatment of sport and football cases’.65
In similar tone, Pearson describes the EU sports policy
as ‘a complex and ongoing political and economic
exchange between the organisations, other stakeholders
and public authorities’66 which preserves the ability of
SGBs to regulate their sports so far as possible without
interference from EU law: ‘Protecting integrity of compe-
tition, ‘‘competitive balance’’ and ‘‘training and develop-
ment’’ of young players have been the main pillars against
which sport’s governing bodies have looked to support
regulations, practices and traditions that are prima facie
breaches of EU law.’67
Rather than focussing on fair competition, the corner-
stone of the EC sport policy is the promotion of open and
fair sports governance, which it seeks to promote through
the Social Dialogue principles, under EU social law con-
tained in Article 154 TFEU.68 This is not a natural inter-
pretation (vague though it is) of the Article 165 duty of
‘developing the European dimension in sport, by promot-
ing fairness and openness in sporting competitions.’
In its 2011 policy paper, ‘Developing the European
dimension in Sport’69 (a follow-up to the 2007 White Paper
on sport) the EC goes so far as to say that ‘[g]ood gover-
nance in sport is a condition for the autonomy and self-
regulation of sport organisations.’70 In this policy docu-
ment the EC cites ‘democracy, transparency and account-
ability in decision-making, and inclusiveness in the
representation of interested stakeholders’71 as the inter-
linked principles that should underpin sports governance at
European level. The importance of governance in the EU
sports policy is emphasized by the creation of an EU
Expert Group on Good Governance which reported in 2013
that the EU ‘can provide guidance for the good governance
of sport at national, European and international level’72
based on ‘the rule of law which it has the task to promote’;
‘the rule of law’ is summarized in three principles: (i) the
separation of powers, (ii) public procurement based on
transparency and impartiality and (iii) the ‘recognition of
social dialogue and of the role of social partners in the
fields of labour law and employment’.73
The social dialogue principle is the EC’s answer to the
question ‘who rules?’ posed by Gardiner and Welch, in the
light of the perennial conflict between the right of sport to
regulate itself, or be bound by rulings and decisions of the
CJEU. Gardiner and Welch proposed as a solution to this
problem a system of reflexive law based on dialogue
between social partners.74
Weatherill summarised the judicially created sports law
norm as autonomy for SGBs from EU law conditional on
their ‘sporting rules’ responding proportionally to an
inherent need in the sport where they have an economic
impact.75 The reason for the lack of coherence in EU sports
law is the EC sports policy which appears to elevate above
this principle the importance of social dialogue in sports
governance. This is seen clearly in the EC’s political
support for UEFA’s FFP Regulations. In October 2014
Commissioner Androulla Vassiliou, Member of the Euro-
pean Commission for Education, Culture, Multilingualism
and Youth, strongly supported the FFP Regulations as a
‘key tool to ensure transparency and to promote better
governance standards within sport’.76 To a certain extent
the FFP Regulations are a manifestation of social dialogue
in football, but on closer inspection, they reflect the com-
mercial domination of the elite European football clubs
over UEFA, and their effect, as described below, is to stifle
fair competition.
4 The financial fair play regulations
The emphasis placed by the EC on ‘good governance’
spurred the creation by UEFA in 2008 of a Social Dialogue
Committee for European Professional Football between the
regulators (UEFA) and the regulated (the clubs, leagues
and players). In due course, UEFA procured the
64 Geeraert and Drieskens (2015), p. 14, for a discussion of the
Parliament’s role in formulation of sports policy, deriving partly from
its control over EU budgets.
65 ibid, p. 11.
66 See Pearson (2015).
67 ibid.
68 The promotion of social dialogue in football by the EC led to an
agreement on standardised player contracts. The Commission funded
a number of projects exploring social dialogue between players and
clubs which are listed at footnote 149, European Commission Staff
Working Document (2007).
69 see European Commission (2011) at 4.2 ‘The specific nature of
sport’.
70 ibid, at 4.1,10.
71 ibid, at 4.1,10.
72 2011/C 162/01 (established on the basis of the Council Resolution
on an EU Work Plan for Sport 2011-2014) Expert Group ‘Good
Footnote 72 continued
Governance’ Deliverable 2 Principles of good governance in sport
(2013) p. 5.
73 ibid, p. 6.
74 Gardiner and Welch (2007), p. 1.
75 Weatherill (2011).
76 See European Commission (2014c); see also European Commis-
sion (2012).
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endorsement of its new Financial Fair Play rules from this
new body. Endorsement by the players union FifPro77 has
the advantage of minimising a challenge to the FFP Reg-
ulations; any challenge would in the first instance have to
be to the Court of Arbitration for Sport based in
Switzerland.78
The background to the FFP Regulations was the grow-
ing evidence of debt79 among top European football clubs.
This led in 2009, to UEFA’s Financial Control Panel
amending its existing licensing regulations with the addi-
tion of a new ‘break-even requirement’, which is the core
of the Financial Fair Play Regulations.80 They provide that
football clubs, as a condition for taking part in the most
lucrative81 sports competition globally (the UEFA Cham-
pions’ League), face a new limit on the amount they can
invest in their largest item of expenditure, namely pur-
chasing, and paying the wages of, players. Under the
‘break-even’ rule, clubs can not spend more than their
income derived from football activities, and equity
investment from rich benefactors can not be counted as part
of the club’s income.82
The phenomenon of the rich investor83 purchasing a
football club had spawned a new vocabulary, e.g., a
‘benefactor’ as opposed to a ‘self-sustaining’ club and the
concept of the ‘sugar daddy’. Muller likens the ‘sugar
daddy’ phenomenon and excessive funding in football
clubs to medical doping, and argues that financial doping
threatens sport’s integrity and therefore potentially in the
longer term, its popularity and viability.84 Flanagan cites
evidence of the huge inward ‘sugar daddy’ investment in
the benefactor (or ‘investor’) clubs having a direct affect
also on the wages paid at the ‘self-sustaining’ clubs.85 In
the words of Michel Platini86 justifying the introduction of
the ‘break-even’ rule: ‘The many clubs across Europe that
continue to operate on a sustainable basis…are finding it
increasingly hard to coexist and compete with clubs that
incur costs and transfer fees beyond their means and report
losses year-after-year.’87
UEFA’s stated objective for the FFP Regulations is to
improve the ‘economic and financial capability’ of the top
flight European football clubs thereby ensuring their future
‘long-term viability’.88 In UEFA’s own words, the FFP
Regulations were introduced with a view ‘to decrease
pressure on salaries and transfer fees and limit inflationary
effect […] to encourage long-term investments in the youth
sector and infrastructure’.89 It is not surprising, therefore,
that the amounts invested by clubs in players have been
reduced, in comparison with what would be the case in an
unregulated free market. Whether this is an object or an
effect of the FFP Regulations is of course irrelevant from
the point of view of Article 101 TFEU. Peeters and Szy-
manski in their 2012 study into the likely economic effects
of the FFP Regulations concluded that wage to turnover
ratios would fall by as much as 15 %.90 UEFA’s bench-
mark report 2013/14 suggests this was a conservative
estimate as it records that for the first time in several years
the growth in revenue outpaced wage increase, thereby
contributing to an improvement of 36 % in aggregated net
results reported by all top division clubs, from a record
€1.7 billion in 2011 to €1.1 billion net loss, a similar level
to 2009.91 Deloitte92 reports that the 2013/14 season’s
overall wages/revenue ratio fell to 59 % across the ‘big
five’ leagues,93 its lowest level since 1999/00.
The ‘break-even’ requirement of the FFP Regulations
clearly restricts competition and has suppressed the wages
of players through the introduction of a ‘soft’ salary cap,94
and may thus be construed as anti-competitive in terms of
77 see Parrish (2011) for a discussion of this committee. See https://
fifpro.org/en/news/fifpro-demands-sanctions-in-financial-fair-play-
concept for comments by FIFPro’s General Secretary Theo van
Seggelen welcoming FFP and calling for tougher sanctions on clubs
in breach of the rules.
78 UEFA’s statutes at Article 61 give jurisdiction to CAS to arbitrate
on disputes between UEFA and clubs, players and leagues and
associations ‘to the exclusion of any ordinary court’. Swiss club FC
Sion’s jurisdictional challenge led to threats from FIFA to expel
Switzerland from international football; see further Flanagan (2013).
79 see UEFA (2009).
80 see n 11 supra.
81 Deloitte (2015).
82 Certain items of expenditure however are exempted from the
‘break-even’ calculation, for example, investment in stadia, training
grounds, community development and youth academies; see arts
57–60 of the FFP Regulations; a deviation of €30 million in
contributions from equity participants or related parties is permitted
for the 2015/16 through to 2018/19 periods under art 61(2). For a
fuller description of the FFP Regulations see Serby (2014b) and
Bastianon (2015).
83 For further discussion see Flanagan (2013); see Vopel (2013). The
trailblazer was Roman Abramovich at FC Chelsea who invested
approximately half a billion euros on the club in the first decade of the
century, more recently at Manchester City FC Sheikh Mansour bin Al
Nahyan who purchased the club in 2008 is reported to have invested
over one billion pounds of his personal wealth in the club.
84 Mu¨ller et al (2012), p. 117.
85 Flanagan (2013), p. 162.
86 From 2007 to 2015 UEFA’s President (and very much personally
associated with the introduction of the FFP Regulations, for whom it
has been something of a crusade).
87 UEFA (2008).
88 Art 2.
89 UEFA (2015b).
90 See Peeters and Szymanski (2012).
91 UEFA (2014).
92 Deloitte (2015).
93 England, Germany, Italy, Spain and France.
94 For a discussion of hard as opposed to soft salary caps in place in
individual sports both in Europe and elsewhere, see Lindholm (2010),
p. 190.
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Article 101(1) (a) TFEU which prohibits direct or indirect
fixing of purchasing or selling prices. Weatherill is in no
doubt that the break-even requirement is in effect:
a horizontal agreement between suppliers (of sports
services: clubs) which includes commitments to
restrain spending (inter alia on players’ wages). It is
also strengthened by vertical restraints (licensing
requirements) enforced by UEFA, the governing
body. It is a restriction on competition (to acquire
players’ services) which has the effect (inter alia) of
depressing the levels of remuneration payable to
players.95
Article 101(1)(b) TFEU prohibits agreements or deci-
sions that limit investment. The EC has previously held an
agreement between two rival breweries to jointly halt
investments in downstream capacities to be a hard core
infringement.96 The CJEU held a ‘crisis cartel’ that aimed
to cut overinvestment a restriction of competition by object
contrary to Article 101(1)(b) TFEU.97 As Petit, who coined
the term ‘oligopoleague’ to describe the cartel of elite
European football clubs created by the FFP Regulations,
puts it: ‘in real life markets, debt is a conventional strategy
to finance productive investments, and a driver of market
competition’.98
Another anti-competitive effect of the soft salary cap
contained in the ‘break-even’ requirement is that it has had
as expected a negative impact on the competitive balance
within football leagues.99 As a result of the ‘break-even’
rule a cartel of elite clubs is in a permanently privileged
position in the upstream input market for purchase of
players. This triggers privilege also in the downstream
secondary markets such as media rights, merchandising,
tickets and sponsorship. There is considerable evidence of
the fact that ‘a club’s material success on the pitch is
broadly predicated on their gross spend on players’
wages’.100 Vopel’s study for example supports the con-
tention that the break-even requirement ‘unintentionally
protects well-established clubs from being challenged by
non-established clubs’101 and can be considered as a barrier
to entry for smaller clubs. The restriction on investment
implements ‘collusion’ that results in rent shifting.102
The beneficiaries of the cartel, are the elite clubs,
brought together in the European Club Association
(ECA).103 Although UEFA consulted with national asso-
ciations and leagues (many of whom have their own
domestic version of financial fair play rules104 ), the
greatest leverage, in relation to the introduction and scope
of the new ‘break-even’ rule came from the group whom
the rules most benefit, which is not surprising given their
economic muscle. In 1998 the elite clubs, broadly speaking
those clubs now in the ECA, threatened a breakaway from
UEFA with a proposed European Super League competi-
tion.105 Under Article 102 TFEU UEFA would be unable to
prevent clubs or players joining such ‘unofficial’ compe-
titions.106 The EC’s sport policy might have to be
rethought if elite clubs broke away from UEFA, as a key
part of the ‘European model of sport’ is the football
pyramid and the links between the grass roots and the elite
echelons of professional sport, this being one of sport’s key
specificities, which earns it special treatment under EU
sports policy.107 The breakaway was prevented by UEFA’s
change of format of the Champions League, which together
with the ‘break-even’ rule protects the financial dominance
of the elite clubs. Geeraert and Drieskens have compared
the relationship between European elite football clubs and
UEFA to the principal (clubs)/agent (UEFA)
relationship.108
The suspicion that the ‘break-even’ rule is largely a
negotiated agreement between UEFA and the elite clubs
whom it benefits is reinforced both by the manner in which
it is enforced (the amount of sanctions being a matter for
private negotiation109 between individual clubs and UEFA)
and by the willingness of UEFA to amend the rules under
pressure from the ECA.110
95 Weatherill (2013).
96 See Decision of the Commission of 29 September 2004, COMP/
C.37750/B2—Brasseries Kronenbourg, Brasseries Heineken, OJ L
184 of 15 July 2005, p. 57.
97 Case C- 209/07, Competition Authority v Beef Industry Develop-
ment Society Ltd et Barry Brothers Meat Lt., [2008], ECR I-08637.
98 Petit (2014).
99 Long (2012), p. 93.
100 Flanagan (2013), p. 160.
101 Vopel (2011).
102 ibid, p. 54.
103 this represents 214 European football clubs from 53 associations
and has endorsed the Regulations, see http://www.ecaeurope.com/
news/eca-statement-on-financial-fair-play/.
104 across the top European national leagues there are a variety of
different versions of the ‘financial fair play’ principle in place; see
further Geey (2012).
105 Pijetlovic (2015) and The Independent (1998).
106 Case C-49/07, MOTOE v. Ellinko Dimosio [2008] ECR I-4863.
107 See European Commission (2007).
108 Geeraert and Drieskens (2015). Extending their analysis of EU
football governance in terms of the Principal/agent relationship,
Geeraert and Drieskens describe the CJEU and Commission as both
agent (of the member states) and principal (of UEFA) who use control
instruments to push UEFA into compliance.
109 See van Maren (2015) in which the author discusses the first
disciplinary sanction under the FFP Regulations where details have
been made public, in June 2015.
110 In June 2015, in response to the reference to the CJEU for a
preliminary ruling, see n 12 supra, UEFA announced the ‘break-even’
rule would be slightly relaxed. UEFA justified the amendments to the
FFP Regulations with reference to consultation with the ECA: ‘These
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5 Competition law in the sports sector: are
the FFP regulations a proportionate response
to a problem inherent in professional football?
Advocate General Lenz’s Opinion in Bosman111 contained
an analysis of competition law as applied to European sport
which remains relevant today, and which prefigured the
ruling in Meca Medina.112 He said that: ‘the field of pro-
fessional football is substantially different from other
markets in that the clubs are mutually dependent on each
other’113 and therefore it was possible ‘that certain
restrictions may be necessary to ensure the proper func-
tioning of the sector’ so that ‘restrictions of competition
which are indispensable for attaining the legitimate
objectives pursued by them do not fall within Article
85(1)’.114
Although sports teams compete with one another to win
competitions, unlike in other sectors of the economy, clubs
need their competitors to survive, in order that overall the
competition retains integrity. Vopel refers to this interde-
pendence in terms of the economic theory of ‘associative
competition’ between sports teams operating within a lea-
gue.115 Out of this associative competition arises a conflict
of interest between the interest of individual clubs and the
interest of the league as a whole. This conflict needs to be
regulated exogenously, and in the case of European foot-
ball by UEFA. UEFA’s FFP Regulations, as a measure to
cure overinvestment (which potentially threatens a club’s
very survival)116 in club football, must be seen in this
context.
The EC has not wavered from its support for the ‘break-
even’ requirement, as evidenced for example by the joint
statement issued by the EC and UEFA on 21 March 2012:
‘the ‘break even’ rule reflects a sound economic principle
that will encourage greater rationality and discipline in club
finances and, in so doing, help to protect the wider interests
of football […] preserving fair competition between foot-
ball clubs.’117
The EC has rejected a complaint that the FFP Regula-
tions infringed Articles 101 and 102 TFEU; the rejection
was on the basis that the complaint was concurrently
pending before a national court in Belgium, but subse-
quently the CJEU has questioned the jurisdiction of that
court.118 So the FFP Regulations may well return for
consideration either by the CJEU or EC.
The first hurdle the FFP Regulations must overcome, to
pass the Wouters test, and demonstrate they are propor-
tionate and the least anti-competitive response to any threat
to professional football’s viability posed by overinvestment
and debt, is to demonstrate that the licensing requirements
in place prior to the FFP Regulations were inadequate.
These required, and still do, clubs to prove at the start of
the season that no debts were due to other clubs, players or
the tax authorities.
Assuming this hurdle was overcome, UEFA would then
need to show there were no other solutions (to overin-
vestment) less restrictive of competition. There is an
obvious alternative to the soft salary cap of the ‘break-
even’ rule: the ‘hard’ salary cap. Hard salary caps have a
significantly less detrimental effect on competition than the
‘break-even’ rule, and are very common. Indeed ‘in most
professional sports leagues around the world, participating
clubs compete among themselves to sign players, subject to
rules imposed by the league or agreed among
themselves’.119
Where hard salary caps operate all the clubs comprising
a league or federation agree to limit equally the amount of
spending on the wages paid to the athlete employees,
irrespective of the financial standing and income of a club.
Such caps120 therefore contribute directly both to main-
taining solvency and competitive balance within the lea-
gue. Although the EC in its White paper on Sport
acknowledged that the legality of salary caps had yet to be
determined,121 salary caps have not been challenged in the
courts to date, and Article L.131-16122 of the French sports
code has clearly legitimised them.
Historically such rules were more a feature of profes-
sional sport outside Europe. In North America they have
been in use in the NBA (basketball) and American football
(NFL) since 1982 and 1993, respectively,123 and they are
also a feature of Australian professional sport (including
Footnote 110 continued
updated regulations come after a two-year collaborative and consul-
tative process involving key stakeholders including the European
Club Association (ECA) via a dedicated UEFA-ECA Working
Group.’ http://www.uefa.org UEFA may be moving towards the type
of regulatory control found in the English Football Association’s
version of the financial fair play rules, namely tolerance for a higher
level of indebtedness (£105 million over 3 years) backed by a bank
guarantee, see n 128 infra.
111 See n 24 supra.
112 See n 27 supra.
113 Bosman, n 24 supra para 270.
114 ibid.
115 Vopel (2011), p. 56.
116 Long (2012), 75 for a discussion of the case of Glasgow Rangers
FC.
117 European Commission (2014c).
118 See n 12 supra.
119 Ross (2004), p. 49.
120 i.e. a cap on the amount that clubs may pay on salaries for players
applied equally to teams within a league.
121 European Commission (2007) (Accompanying document to the
White Paper on Sport, July 11 2007), p.76.
122 Introduced by law no. 2012-158 dated 1st February 2012.
123 Weiler and Roberts (2004), p. 240.
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the Australian Football League, NRL, and the A-lea-
gue).124 Recently hard salary caps have entered into
European sport, through rugby, firstly Rugby League, then
Rugby Union, in 1997 and 1999 respectively.125 The
England and Wales Cricket Board has introduced salary
caps into professional English cricket126; while the FA
Premier League (FAPL) in 2013 introduced a wage cap127
which restricts to £4 million the extra money received from
the league’s greatly increased television revenues128 which
could be spent on players’ wages for the 2013–2014 sea-
son. ‘Hard’ salary caps, unlike the blunt ‘break-even’ rule,
lessen the prospect of a cartel, since they equalise the
expenditure clubs can make on players’ salaries.
A study on the introduction of salary caps into profes-
sional rugby in New Zealand129 illustrates the potential
benefits for competition of ‘hard’ salary caps in sport. After
a major investigation into the proposal by the country’s
rugby federation (New Zealand Rugby Union) to introduce
a salary cap, the New Zealand competition authority (the
Commerce Commission) decided that the benefits of the
hard salary cap for the public outweighed the anti-com-
petitive effects. It was held that the cap would lead to good
players being more evenly shared between teams which
would lead to a more balanced competition leading to
greater public enjoyment. The Commission examined the
economic literature on the ‘uncertainty of outcome
hypothesis’, (that public demand for, and enjoyment of,
sport increases when there is equal competition between
well-matched teams). It is generally assumed that ‘uncer-
tainty of outcome’ is an important determinant of demand
for sports competitions from paying supporters.130 The
Commission also studied evidence of the effect on the size
of television audiences of a league in which standards of
play were raised in consequence of talent being spread
across teams as a result of a salary cap (which prevented
isolated clubs pulling away by signing all the top players).
There is no evidence that UEFA conducted any such
enquiry into the potential negative impact on competition
of the ‘break-even’ rule. European law has ‘established a
rule of reason within the analytical framework set out in
article 101(1) TFEU, to take account of the specificities of
sport’ but this only partly obviates the requirement for the
kind of detailed economic enquiry undertaken by the New
Zealand Commission into the conditions for exemption set
out in the equivalent of Article 101(3) TFEU.131
An alternative to salary caps as a means of preventing
football club insolvency, is the requirement for equity
investors to provide a bank guarantee.132 In June 2015
UEFA announced an amendment to the FFP Regulations,
whereby clubs can submit voluntary agreement applica-
tions by December 31 of the preceding year, with funds
committed in advance and guaranteed over the agreement
period. Former UEFA president Michel Platini, commented
that this would allow clubs to move beyond the strict limits
of the ‘break-even’ rule, and that the revised amendments
provide for football clubs to move from ‘austerity to sus-
tainable growth’.133
6 Conclusions
Garcia and Weatherill characterised the political settlement
that brought about Article 165 TFEU as the ‘next best’
solution from the perspective of sports governing bodies to
sport being given exemption from the treaty, the intent
being to ‘write sport into the Treaty in a way that would
constrain the interventionist tendencies of the EU’s insti-
tutions.’134 The story of the FFP Regulations and how the
EC has responded to them bears this out, and illustrates the
124 Davies (2010), p. 445.
125 Basnier (2014), p. 155.
126 Currently the salary cap for each of the eighteen first class
counties is a maximum of £2 million a year on the salaries of all its
playing staff. For the 2014/15 season the salary cap in the English
rugby union Premiership is £4.76 million, with additional credit of
£30,000 each for up to eight players graduating from the club’s
academy (youth players who have come up through the club’s youth
system). In addition each club is allowed one player’s wages (subject
to certain conditions designed to prevent clubs signing up rival clubs’
better players) to be exempt from the salary cap.
127 Conn (2015).
128 £5.5 billion from 2013–2016. This resulted for the 2013/14 season
in players’ pay increasing by around 5.5 % against an overall income
growth of 22 %. The year after the introduction of the new rules, the
2013–2014 season, for which the clubs published financial results in
April 2015, the FAPL overall made a profit (£198 million) for the first
time in 16 years, compared to a £291 million loss the previous year,
see Conn (2015).
129 Basnier (2014).
130 Szymanski (2003), p. 1137. Although as Vopel points out the long
term competitive equilibrium of European football is possibly more
dependent on the size of the domestic market (in terms for example of
Footnote 130 continued
population, income per capita, interest in football) rather than indi-
vidual patrons, see Vopel, (2011), p. 58.
131 Although there is an argument that the statutory exemption does
not apply in any event in cases of by ‘‘object’’ restrictions of
competition in horizontal agreements like the Regulations. See
European Commission Communication (2004), p. 97.
132 Dupont (2013).
133 This was in response to the legal proceedings described at n 12
supra. It is evidence of itself that the ‘break-even’ rule is vulnerable
to challenge under EU competition law, and therefore supports the
thesis of this article. For details of the amendments to the ‘break-
even’ rule, with exceptions introduced also for clubs in countries
where the market is considered to have structural economic deficien-
cies, see 11 supra n UEFA (2015b).
134 Garcia and Weatherill (2012), p. 23.
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continuing uncertainty as to how ‘hard’ EU law is applied
to sporting bodies and their rules by the EC.
The EC’s approach to the FFP Regulations demonstrates
the amorphous nature of EU sports law and the political
strength of UEFA; specifically it illustrates the EC’s lack of
ambition in strictly enforcing competition law in the sports
sector (it prefers to promote ‘social dialogue’ even when
the parties to the dialogue have a striking inequality of
bargaining position). It is perhaps understandable that the
EC has supported UEFA over Financial Fair Play, which
has (for the time being) discouraged the elite clubs
breaking away from UEFA. The EC would prefer UEFA to
remain the undisputed regulator of European football at all
levels under the paradigm of the (so-called by the EC)
‘European model of sport’, with its pyramid system of
governance.135 UEFA’s regulation of the whole European
footballing pyramid, from the wealthiest clubs to the
amateur game, must be understood in the context of the
influence (a product of their commercial success) of the
dominant clubs of the ECA, and ultimately the potential for
the ‘super clubs’ to form a ‘break-away’ super league in
place of UEFA’s competitions.136
Superficially, it appears that the FFP Regulations
achieve their intended object. UEFA has stated that the
FFP Regulations (specifically the ‘break-even’ require-
ment) have had a very positive impact on the scale of
overdue payables of licensed clubs which had decreased
from €57 million in June 2011 to €8 million in June 2014,
while aggregate losses reported by Europe’s first-division
clubs in the 2013 financial year had gone down to
€800 million from a deficit of €1.7 billion in 2011.137
However, the ‘break-even’ requirement of the FFP
Regulations has created a cartel, an ‘oligopoleague’, which
makes it very difficult for clubs to challenge existing
members of the ECA for success and participation in
UEFA’s competitions (the Champions League and the
Europa League).138
It is unlikely that UEFA could prove to the satisfaction
of the CJEU that the anti-competitive effect of the FFP
Regulations (the cartel effect) is a proportionate response
to an inherent requirement for regulation by UEFA, i.e.,
that ‘the consequential effects restrictive of competition are
inherent in the pursuit of [their] objectives and are pro-
portionate to them’.139 This is because there are alternative
measures available to cure the problem of overinvestment
in top European football clubs, which would not stifle
competition between investors in football clubs. One such
measure would be a hard salary cap, which has the added
benefit, by sharing top players around clubs, of creating
fairer competition, leading to a more interesting spectacle
for the consumer, potentially, therefore, proving in the long
term more financially rewarding for the sport as a whole.140
Another measure capable of preventing football club
insolvency, not so restrictive of competition between
investors, would be the requirement of a bank guarantee to
secure debt.141 On proportionality grounds the ‘breakeven’
requirement of the FFP Regulations is therefore hard to
defend under the Wouters test. In any event, UEFA would
first have to demonstrate why its original licensing rules
were deemed inadequate to restrain overspending and the
risk of clubs becoming insolvent.142 Any legal analysis of
the ‘proportionality’ of the ‘break-even’ rule would also
need to consider the various other means capable of curing
the potential for insolvency brought about by
135 See European Commission (2011).
136 See BBC (2016). In January 2016 Karl-Heinz Rummenigge, chief
executive of Bayern Munich FC, and one of 15 on the executive board
of the ECA (see http://www.ecaeurope.com/about-eca/structure/eca-
executive-board/), described the latest initiative by the top European
clubs to form a super league of 20 teams from Italy, England, Spain,
Germany and France (with direct entry into the tournament rather
than as happens currently qualification to the UEFA competitions
through their domestic league position in the previous season): ‘A
super league outside of the Champions League is being born. It will
either be led by Uefa or by a separate entity, because there is a limit to
how much money can be made.’ There is surely no coincidence in the
fact that this initiative coincided with another ECA Executive board
member Manchester United FC, facing omission from the Champions
League for the 2016/17 season through poor performance in the FAPL
in the 2015/16 season. Manchester United FC is listed by Forbes as
just outside the top 5 richest sports club globally with a value of $3.1
billion, see Lutz (2015). Geey (2012) reports that some of the Annex
XI provisions of the FFP Regulations (the exclusion of investment in
infrastructure and youth development as football expenditure in cal-
culating break-even) were included after the ECA insisted on their
inclusion. According to Mu¨ller et al. (2012) at 134 the ECA suc-
cessfully lobbied for the exclusion of player contracts undertaken
prior to June 2010 from the break-even calculations for the first two
monitoring periods.
137 UEFA (2014).
138 Petit (2014). The closing stages of the FAPL 2015/16 season have
been marked by the emergence of Leicester City FC as contenders for
champions, in place of the better-heeled clubs from Manchester and
of course the previous year’s winners Chelsea FC, and they may be
described as the exception to the rule that money buys success (for
which see the one sided French league season 2015/16 where Paris St
Germain FC, the richest club, and interestingly the first recipients of a
sanction under the break-even rule of the FFP Regulations (see Serby
2014b), are completely unchallenged). The response to Leicester’s
success is the situation described in n 137 above, which reinforces the
sense of a cartel.
139 Meca-Medina, n 27 supra, para 42.
140 The FAPL has its own Financial Fair Play rules which include an
element of a hard salary cap since they restrict the proportion of
revenue derived from the television rights deal the Premier League’s
clubs can spend on wages; see further Conn (2015).
141 See further Dupont (2013).
142 i.e. the continuing requirement for a licence applicant to prove
that as of 31 March preceding the season for which a licence is
applied for that it has no overdue payables, now Annex VIII of the
FFP Regulations.
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overinvestment in professional football clubs. For example
the so-called ‘Football Creditors rule’143 system employed
in English football for many years, has largely achieved its
objective of ensuring football clubs meet their debts to
other clubs, (incurred typically though transfer deals) thus
preventing the occurrence of a ‘domino’ effect leading to
multiple club insolvencies. Lindholm suggests as further
alternative solutions to overinvestment: the reduction of
compensation for clubs taking part in top competitions (to
mitigate the consequences of the ‘rat race’ phenomenon);
revenue sharing; banning cash trade of players and a luxury
tax.144
Although on 16 July 2015 the CJEU declared the ref-
erence to it of the Striani claim (that the FFP Regulations
infringe inter alia EU competition law) by the Belgian
national court under Article 267 TFEU manifestly inad-
missible, this was certainly not a substantive ruling on the
merits of the case.145 It was merely a reflection of the
lower court’s lack of internal logic in referring to the
CJEU a matter it itself had ruled it could not rule on, on
jurisdictional grounds.146 UEFA’s decision to amend the
FFP Regulations in June 2015, to relax the rules on
investment in football clubs, immediately prior to the
CJEU ruling, suggests a certain lack of confidence in their
belief that the FFP Regulations comply with EU compe-
tition law.147
How then to explain the attitude of the EC to the FFP
Regulations, when there is a strong prima facie case that
they infringe EU competition law? Under the typology
devised by Terpan for soft and hard norms in the EU, the
EU legal order is complex, comprising both hard and soft
law, soft law comprising both legally binding and non-
binding norms.148 EC sports law policy, despite now hav-
ing a basis in Treaty, supplementing the (mainly
antecedent) jurisprudence of the CJEU, lacks any clear
‘hard’ obligation, and is denuded by the ambiguous Treaty
concepts of the ‘specificity of sport’ and ‘fairness’.149 This
lack of ‘hard’ obligation is demonstrated, and exacerbated
by, the deference shown by the EC to sporting federations,
in particular UEFA, in applying competition law to the
rules of sporting bodies (such as the Financial Fair Play
Regulations).
The preference of the EC for a collaborative form of ‘soft
law’ rather than enforcement/obligation of ‘hard’ compe-
tition law as a basis for its sports policy was evidenced by
the joint announcement in October 2014 that representa-
tives of UEFA and the EC would institute a joint working
party to consider European football policy. The official
announcement (in an EC Decision of 14 October 2014),
stated that the bodies: ‘share a common goal to promote and
safeguard the values of fairness and openness in sport in
their respective areas of action…’.150 With regard to
Financial Fair Play the statement read: ‘subject to compli-
ance with competition law, measures to encourage greater
rationality and discipline in club finances with a focus on
the long term as opposed to the short-term, such as the
Financial Fair Play initiative, contribute to the sustainable
development and healthy growth of sport in Europe.’ As
Bret and Watson rightly point out, the EC’s ability to reg-
ulate competition in matters arising from UEFA initiatives
is constrained by this 3-year agreement.151
In the so-called ENIC reference to the EC in 2000, (in
which the complainant alleged that UEFA’s rule prohibit-
ing multiple investment in football clubs infringed EU
competition law), UEFA submitted it did not have ‘a legal
duty to divine the least restrictive alternative to protect
integrity of competition,’ and nor, argued UEFA, was it for
the EC to assess whether there was a less restrictive
alternative, ‘since that would mean that the Commission
would end up as the de facto regulator for sport’.152 Since143 See Serby (2014a).
144 Lindholm (2010) Although the objective of the FFP Regulations
is not to restore competitive balance to the higher leagues in European
football, this could be achieved through such a redistribution
mechanism requiring wealthier clubs to share resources with less
profitable clubs. Some view this as impracticable in the context of
European sport with its system of open leagues, although it has been
successful in the United States system of ‘closed’ leagues. A ‘luxury
tax’ is arguably less restrictive of free competition between investors
in football clubs. Under this proposal a tax on salary expenditure over
a certain limit is redistributed to less wealthy teams; see also
Szymanski (2003) at 1172 and Vopel (2011) at 58.
145 Case C-299/15 Striani & Others, ECLI:EU:C:2015:519; see
discussion above at n 12.
146 For further analysis of the CJEU ruling and why it is not
substantive, see Bastianon (2015) at 27 who states of the ruling of the
CJEU on 16 July 2015, ‘to date there is no formal decision that has
assessed the compatability of FFP with EU law. From this point of
view UEFA can only claim to have won a battle not the war’.
147 UEFA (2015a). See further n 110 above.
148 Terpan (2015), p. 72.
149 These terms are used in TFEU Article 165.
150 European Commission (2014b).
151 Brett and Watkins (2014).
152 Monti (2002) at para 21. The EC, relying on Court of Justice
authority, (Case C-41/90 Hˆfner v Macroton [1991] ECR I- 1979.;
Case T-513/93 CNSD v Commission, [2000] ECR, paragraph 39; Case
71/74 FRUBO [1975] ECR, p. 563) concluded that, ‘the possible
effect on the freedom of action of clubs and investors is inherent to
the very existence of credible UEFA competitions, and in any case, it
[the rule] does not lead to a limitation on the freedom of action of
clubs and investors that goes beyond what is necessary to ensure its
legitimate aim of protecting the uncertainty of the results and giving
the public the right perception as to the integrity of the UEFA
competitions with a view to ensure their proper functioning’. The EC
concluded therefore that the rule fell outside the scope of Article
81(1), even though it accepted that the rule suppressed demand, and
that neither did it fall foul of Article 82 since there was no evidence of
any discrimination in the way the rule was applied, so therefore no
abuse. See also European Commission (2002)
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the ENIC case, the EU has formally assumed a competence
in sport through Article 165, and arguably the EC has
staked a claim to be a de facto EU sports regulator153:
Through its dialogue with sport stakeholders, the
Commission will continue its efforts to explain, on a
theme-per-theme basis, the relation between EU law
and sporting rules in professional and amateur sport.
As requested by Member States and the sport
movement in the consultation, the Commission is
committed to supporting an appropriate interpretation
of the concept of the specific nature of sport and will
continue to provide guidance in this regard. Regard-
ing the application of EU competition law, the
Commission will continue to apply the procedure as
foreseen in Regulation (EC) No 1/2003.154
However, during this process whereby the EC has
assumed a steering role over sports governing bodies, there
appears to have been a watering down of the original
principles of EU sports law when they are applied by the
EC; a ‘politicization of public enforcement of competition
law’ which has led to the ‘generous treatment of sport and
football cases’.155 Or as Bastianon puts it in relation to the
FFP Regulations: ‘an outside observer could reasonably
think that the Commission is not fully convinced of the
legitimacy of FFP but does not want to be the first to
clearly say it because of a kind of deference towards
UEFA.’156
Does EC sports law policy qualify in Terpan’s cate-
gorisation as a ‘soft law’ norm, i.e. soft obligation/hard
enforcement (since the effectiveness of soft rules
depends on a strong shadow of hierarchy)?157 EC policy
towards the FFP Regulations can better be described as
the delegalisation of the legal norm that where the
sporting rules of sports governing bodies have an anti-
competitive effect they are lawful only insofar as they
are proportionate.
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Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (http://crea
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